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Effects of Increased Reporting Frequency on Nonprofessional Investors’ Earnings 
Predictions 
 
More frequent financial reporting has been a topic of debate for many years. However, 
little evidence exists about the possible effects of more frequent reporting on investors’ decision 
making.  Using a between-subjects experiment, this study analyzes how altering the timing or 
frequency of earnings reports - weekly, as opposed to quarterly reports - affects the accuracy and 
dispersion of earnings predictions by nonprofessional investors.  This is important since 
regulators have identified nonprofessionals as a significant audience for financial reports.  I 
hypothesize and find that more frequent reporting results in less accurate predictions and greater 
variance, particularly when a strong seasonal pattern exists. Finally, investors in the more 
frequent reporting condition self-reported that they were more influenced by older historical data 
- suggesting primacy effects - while those in the less frequent reporting condition self-reported 
that they were more influenced by the newer historical data suggesting recency effects.   
Keywords:  disclosure frequency; earnings forecasts; accuracy; investor confidence. 
Data Availability:  Data are available from the author on request. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Investors in securities markets search for information germane to making investment 
decisions. Earnings are clearly a primary variable of interest to the investment community. 
Investors view earnings with great interest since it represents a summary measure of 
performance and is believed to convey information about a firm’s future cash-flow prospects 
(FASB, 1994 and Elliott, 2006).   Further, market value can be expressed as a function of book 
value plus the present value of future expected abnormal earnings [Ohlson, 1995, p. 664]. Since 
expected abnormal earnings represents forecasted earnings reduced by a charge for capital, it is 
clear that predictions of earnings play a central role in explaining firm value under the Feltham 
and Ohlson (1995) model.  As discussed by Bernard (1995, pp. 734-35), the work of Feltham and 
Ohlson reduces the importance of explaining stock price changes and emphasizes the forecasting 
of earnings. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the timely reporting of earnings is critical in financial 
decision making.   This has been widely discussed in accounting.  Yet, wide disparities in the 
timing of issuance of earnings reports persist:  some European firms issue earnings reports 
semiannually, and have resisted attempts by regulators to require more frequent reporting 
(Commission 2003).  At the other end of the spectrum, firms such as Cisco have already adopted 
the concept of real-time internal reporting, with the view that  technologies such as XBRL 
(eXtensible Business Reporting Language) will make frequent external reporting a realistic 
possibility (Watson et al., 2000).  In order to examine how more frequent reporting can affect 
investors and their decisions, I examine two extremes of financial reporting, weekly and 
quarterly. Specifically, this research compares the accuracy and variability of earnings 
assessments of nonprofessional investors that have access to weekly earnings reports with other 
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nonprofessional investors that have access to quarterly earnings reports.1 Thus this research not 
only investigates whether more frequent reporting makes it harder for investors to detect 
earnings patterns, it also speaks directly to the more fundamental question of whether or not 
more frequent reporting in and of itself is more difficult to process by investors.   
More frequent reporting of earnings is often seen as strictly advantageous to investors, and 
presumably, less frequent reporting is disadvantageous.  One major benefit of more frequent 
reporting is the likelihood of more timely information provided to investors.2  Offsetting this 
benefit, however, are potentially negative effects of increased frequency on subjective judgment.  
Gneezy and Potters (1997) indicate and show that more frequent evaluations made possible by 
more frequent reporting of securities returns increased nonprofessional investors’ impressions of 
the uncertainty of the returns, and more frequent evaluations of earnings may have similar 
effects. Benartzi and Thaler (1995, 1999) show that the frequency of reporting can affect the 
perceived uncertainty and volatility of an event leading to adverse effects on decision-making.  
More frequent reporting has already been shown to have adverse effects on management 
decision making (Bhojraj and Libby, 2005).  
 Moreover, larger data sets resulting from more frequent earnings reports could increase 
investors’ cognitive load, decreasing the quality of decision making, and making it more likely 
that nonprofessionals will rely on simple heuristics (Schroder et al., 1967).  Larger data sets may 
increase a number of judgment errors that have been demonstrated in the literature: failure to 
detect significant patterns in data series (Klayman, 1988), incorrect identification of patterns in 
                                                 
1
 This research should not be viewed a claim for or against weekly/quarterly reporting per se but rather as a 
theoretical tool for examining the benefits or costs of more/less frequent financial reporting.   
2
 Other benefits have also been claimed for more frequent reporting.  Hunton et al. (2003) argue that more frequent 
reporting of earnings would reduce the ability of managers to engage in earnings management and assist investors in 
detecting earnings management, because they would have more information to detect trends, patterns and 
fluctuations in earnings.   
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particular data series (Maines and Hand, 1996), or the tendency to see patterns in a random series 
(Andreassen, 1987, 1990; Bloomfield et al., 2000; Lim and O’Connor, 1996; O’Connor et al., 
1993).  Nonprofessional investors, who are less likely to use sophisticated models to predict 
earnings, may be particularly vulnerable to such effects. 
In this study, I experimentally examine how the frequency of earnings reports affects the 
accuracy and dispersion of earnings predictions of nonprofessional investors.  Investor 
participants are randomly assigned to either the more frequent (weekly) or less frequent 
(quarterly) reporting conditions.   The weekly earnings series were constructed so that the 
weekly earnings provided no statistical advantage or disadvantage in estimating quarterly 
earnings.3 Consequently, this study only measures judgment effects of more frequent reporting 
that are not due to differences in information content.  
The results suggest that, holding information content constant, more frequent reporting leads 
to less accurate and more dispersed predictions of quarterly earnings.  Additional analyses 
suggest that investors in both conditions demonstrated effects of heuristics when forming their 
predictions, consistent with previous findings from the Belief Adjustment Model (BAM) 
literature (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992).  Results also suggest that investors in the more frequent 
reporting condition were as confident in their judgments as those in the less frequent condition, 
despite being less accurate. 
This study contributes to the regulatory debate, both in the United States and abroad, 
concerning the usefulness of more frequent reporting of earnings. This research can help decide 
                                                 
3
 Additionally, it is important to clarify that the more frequent reporting condition did not contain only noise, but in 
fact contained as useful/informative information as the less frequent reporting condition.  Doing so specifically tests 
the predictability of more frequent reporting earnings data to that of less frequent reporting data.  Additionally 
construction ensured that the prediction errors associated with the more frequent reporting condition are no different 
from those in the less frequent reporting condition. That is, even if participants failed to aggregate the weekly data 
(more frequent) into quarters, they could predict earnings with the same accuracy as those in the less frequent 
reporting condition.   
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whether to impose more frequent, and potentially more costly, interim reporting. In fact, regulators 
and other interested parties in both the United States (Elliott, 2000) and Europe (IASC, 1996; 
Commission, 2003) have recommended that more frequent reporting be required or, at a minimum, 
encouraged.  
Regulators and researchers have tended to focus on the benefits of more frequent reporting. 
This study suggests that there are potential costs to investors’ use of frequent reporting and these 
costs should be incorporated into the debate. The findings of this research not only indicates that 
more frequent reporting leads to poor decision making, but also provide insight into how 
investors use more frequent reporting to make predictions. This research also contributes to the 
time series forecasting literature.  While previous research has examined the effects of various 
factors in times series forecasting, the research has not examined how the frequency of reporting 
can affect forecasting judgments.4   Results in the archival capital markets research literature 
suggest that nonprofessional investors are less successful at incorporating the time series 
properties of earnings into their forecast than are professional investors (Abarbanell and Bernard, 
1992; Jacob et al., 1999).  Examining nonprofessional investors’ judgments has the potential to 
add convergent validity to the results found in the capital markets literature as well as provide 
new insights into nonprofessional investors’ use of time-series data. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 is comprised of the literature 
review and hypotheses development, while Section 3 details the experimental design.  Section 4 
contains the empirical results, while conclusions and future directions are laid out in Section 5. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 See Webby and O’Connor (1996) for a review of judgmental and statistical time series literature. 
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The relative costs and benefits of increased reporting frequency have long been of interest to 
regulators, managers and investors.  More frequent reporting may have negative effects on the 
subjective judgment of nonprofessional investors that may offset any potential informational 
benefits, and examining potential effects on judgment is a central question undertaken in this 
research.  Next, theory from the subjective forecasting literature is used to motivate the 
hypotheses about specific effects of more frequent reporting on judgment accuracy and 
prediction dispersion.  
 
Effects of Increased Frequency on Accuracy 
It is important to understand how nonprofessional investors make earnings predictions since 
the price of a share is-or should be-determined by all investors’ current expectations about the 
future values of variables that measure relevant performance and profitability, particularly 
earnings per share.  Furthermore, as much as 42% of ownership in the top 1,000 U.S. companies 
is made up of nonprofessional investors (Editorial staff, 2000). Consequently, research has 
focused on nonprofessional investors’ use of earnings reports to make judgments about future 
earnings, risk and firm value (Maines and McDaniel, 2000; Bartov et al., 2000; Maines and 
Hand, 1996).   I discuss how investors can be affected by more frequent reporting by first 
assuming that investors can extract and use data perfectly-that is act in a perfectly Bayesian 
manner.   I then assume that extraction and use is limited by individual ability (i.e., effort) and 
finally I examine what could happen if investors are susceptible to psychological biases such as 
recency or primacy effects. 
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Perfect Bayesian Rationality 
If investors behave in a perfect Bayesian manner, they would both extract and use all 
available information from the fundamental data in the same way, resulting in both high 
accuracy and little or no dispersion.  Each investor would generate a forecast that will be the 
weighted average of their prior belief about earnings adjusted by their analysis of all of the 
available information. Investors would not focus on any one particular piece or aspect of the 
data.  Additionally, in a perfect Bayesian world, it is assumed that the investor would not be 
susceptible to exogenous factors such as time constraints or fatigue.  Therefore uninformative 
information would lead to no adjustment of prior beliefs, while informative information would 
lead to relatively extreme adjustments of prior beliefs.  This is important since in this study the 
disaggregated data (more frequent reporting condition) would not result in any additional 
information content as compared to the aggregated data (less frequent reporting condition).  That 
is, this study analyzes the impact of more frequent reporting when information content is held 
constant. Consequently, if investors behave as perfect Bayesians and accumulate and use the 
available data identically, there would be no forecast error and dispersion would be identical 
across individuals and subsequent groups. 
Bayesian Rationality Limited by Individual Differences and Ability. 
It is well known that the capacity of working memory is constrained.  Due to individual 
differences and/or ability constraints, when nonprofessional investors process large quantities of 
data, they are not likely to consistently focus on the same subset of the data, resulting in 
incomplete or different data extraction (Bouwman, 1982).  Incomplete or different data 
extraction means that investors will be differently informed by the same data (Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1997).  Further, people often tend to see trends or streaks in truly random data series, 
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but they do not all see identical trends or streaks (Andreassen, 1987, 1990; Bloomfield et al., 
2000; Lim and O’Connor, 1996; O’Connor et al., 1993). Similarly, nonprofessional investors 
often incorrectly identify patterns in nonrandom data series. For example, Maines and Hand 
(1996) found that nonprofessional investors incorrectly detected autoregressive components in 
quarterly seasonal random walk data.  
Three years of more frequently (weekly) reported data will include 156 earnings reports.  
Many nonprofessional investors will not be able to use all of this data.  Consequently, they will 
differ with respect to how much of it they use and what conclusions they draw from it.  As a 
result, earnings predictions are likely to be less accurate.  Consider the identical seasonal data 
presented in both weekly and quarterly format in Figures 1 and 2 respectively.  
----Insert Figure 1 about here---- 
The weekly fluctuations in the data in Figure 1 make it more difficult to discern the 4th quarter 
earnings increase that is relatively clear in Figure 2.   
----Insert Figure 2 about here---- 
The larger number of data points and more frequent changes of direction in the more frequent 
reporting condition present opportunities for individuals to see a greater variety of nonexistent 
patterns, as well as obscuring real patterns in the data that may exist.   
Additionally, data extraction and use could be limited because it is time consuming and 
effortful.  More frequent reporting will inherently require more effort by investors to aggregate 
and process the data. However, investors will only do so if the expected benefit outweighs the 
cost.  As a consequence, the impact of each additional piece of information (specifically, the 
latter data pieces) could have a decreased impact on the prior beliefs resulting in adverse 
forecasts.  Bloomfield and Hales (2009) posit and show that when financial incentives or rewards 
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are not present, increased workload-such as that brought on by more frequent reporting-is likely 
to lead to effort aversion.  However when financial incentives are present, those making 
predictions are likely to increase their effort.  Specifically, they show that accuracy and 
dispersion are not affected when incentives are held constant across groups.  Because incentives 
don't change as the task becomes more difficult, effort is likely to differ across conditions. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1.  Nonprofessional investors’ absolute prediction errors 
will be greater in the more frequent reporting condition than in the  
less frequent reporting condition. 
 
 
Dispersion indicates to what degree the individual observations of a data set are dispersed or 
'spread out' around their mean.  Dispersion of expectations about earnings is important in 
practice because it can lead to increased trading volume.  H2 focuses on dispersion alone. 
Summarily, the incentives to aggregate more data (decrease effort, save time, etc.), along with 
individuals using different subsets of data, will result in a larger dispersion in the more frequent 
reporting condition.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Variance of predictions will be larger in the more  
frequent reporting condition than in the less frequent reporting  
condition. 
 
Bayesian Rationality Limited by Psychological Biases 
Finally, Bayesian rationality may be adversely affected by different psychological biases.  
Two well known and documented biases are primacy and recency effects.  The Belief 
Adjustment model (BA model hereafter) predicts that an individuals’ attention to more recent 
pieces of information decreases as the amount of information increases in length leading to “a 
force towards primacy” (i.e., more weight is placed on earlier information).  Shorter pieces of 
  10  
information, alternatively can lead to a “force towards recency” (more weight is placed on latter 
pieces of information).  Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) predict that a force towards primacy occurs 
in “long” series of cues for two reasons: 1) individuals tire when tasked with processing large 
amounts of information, which causes them not be able to cognitively process the new 
information( referred to as attention decrement); and 2) as information accumulates, beliefs are 
expected to become less sensitive to the impact of new information since it represents an 
increasingly small proportion of the evidence already processed.  Consequently, in the more 
(less) frequent reporting condition, participants are likely to be susceptible to primacy (recency) 
effects.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. Nonprofessional investors’ in the more frequent reporting condition  
will place more weight on earlier pieces of data (primacy effects), while  
Nonprofessional investors’ in the less frequent reporting condition will place  
more weight on the latter pieces of data (recency effects). 
 
 
3.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Experimental Design and Dependent Variables 
The experimental design is a 2 (quarterly vs. weekly reports) x 2 (earnings series) x 2 
(increases vs. decreases between actual earnings and expected earnings [Foster model]).  The 
variables are explained in Section 3.2 below. The three variables are manipulated between 
participants.  
The dependent variables examined were 1) accuracy of predictions of next quarter’s 
earnings, measured by the absolute difference between the prediction and earnings forecasted by 
the model and 2) dispersion of predictions, measured by the variance of investors’ predictions.  
Hypotheses were tested by comparing judgment performance across frequency conditions.  
Using earning predictions as a dependent variable is preferred for several reasons.  First, as 
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stated earlier, earnings is a summary statistic preferred by investors and researchers due to its 
relation to both firm valuation and performance.  Second, earnings estimates are preferred to 
other measures such as buy, sell or hold since the latter measures can be influenced by other 
factors such is existing positions, holdings, and/or leverage.  Most importantly, being able to 
forecast firm performance (i.e., earnings) is the first step when evaluating a firm and 
subsequently deciding whether to buy, sell or hold. For example, an investor will likely buy (sell) 
a particular stock if he/she determines the firm is undervalued (overvalued) as measured by an 
earnings based estimate. 
Independent Variables and Data Construction 
The investors’ task was to predict quarterly earnings per share based on historical data.  As 
stated earlier, the ability to accurately predict earnings is important due to its direct relation to 
both cash flow predictions and to market valuation.  In the more frequent reporting condition, 
investors received weekly historical earnings per share data. In the less frequent reporting 
condition, investors received quarterly historical earnings per share data.   
Although technology will permit investors to easily view both forms of reporting, analyzing 
how investors use either more frequent or less frequent reporting is important for several 
reasons. It is possible that investors may believe that more frequently reported data is more 
informative than it actually is, or more recent. In addition, they may believe more frequent 
reporting to be more useful in making predictions between quarterly periods. However, because 
of individual cognitive abilities, some nonprofessional investors may opt to use the smaller, less 
cognitively demanding and less frequently reported data. They may also opt to use less 
frequently reported information if they are interested in making predictions with long term time 
horizons. Finally, it is important to initially understand how investors use either more or less 
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frequently reported information because this provides evidence to the effects of more frequent 
reporting in the simplest setting, thus minimizing the cognitive load placed on investors. This 
also provides investors with the best opportunity to make accurate predictions and permits me to 
make stronger inferences about the effects of more frequent reporting. 
To test the effects of more and less reporting frequency, I use earnings data with a seasonal 
pattern, generated from the Foster model.  Both the quarterly and weekly data are seasonal and 
contain the same statistical properties. Since investors only see one type of data I am able to infer 
which format is more beneficial to investors in terms of forecast accuracy and dispersion. The 
Foster model is a relatively simple and effective earnings-prediction model that captures these 
seasonal effects.    
E [Qt] = Qt-4 + δ + φ [Qt-1 – Qt-5]       (1) 
Where: Qt   = Quarterly earnings in current period. 
Qt-1 = Quarterly earnings one quarter prior 
Qt-4 = Quarterly earnings 4 quarters prior     
Qt-5 = Quarterly earnings 5 quarters prior  
 δ = the long run trend in year-to-year quarterly earnings increases. 
 φ = year to year change in quarterly earnings experienced most recently [Qt-1 – Qt-5].  
 
Initial quarterly earnings were those of Compaq Computer Company for the year 1993, which a 
widely used textbook employs as an example of earnings that can be predicted with the Foster 
model (Palepu et al., 1996). The Compaq data exhibited strong fourth quarter seasonality.  The 
expected earnings in the subsequent quarter were generated using Compaq’s values for the phi 
(φ) parameter of .49 and the delta (δ) parameter of .09.  The data was further extrapolated for an 
additional three years (12 quarters).   This was done to remove any resemblance of actual 
earnings for the company.  The data used in the experimental tasks consequently contained the 
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statistical properties of the real data but did not contain any “real earnings” incurred by the 
company.  
 The data for each of the quarters was then evenly disaggregated into equal 13 weeks 
periods resulting in the following equation: 
 
E [Wi] = Wit-4 + δ + φ [Wit-1 – Wit-5]      (2) 
Where: Wi   = Weekly earnings in current week. 
Wit-1 = The earnings in week i 1 quarter prior 
Wit-4 = The earnings in week i 4 quarters prior     
Wit-5 = The earnings in week i 5 quarters prior  
 δw = Year-to-year weekly earnings increases. 
 φw = A fraction of the year to year increase in weekly earnings experienced most 
recently[Wit-1 – Wit-5] 
 
  A small amount of random error N (0, .01) was added to each week’s earnings.  The 
weeks were then subsequently added up into form 12 quarters.  This created the two frequency 
conditions where the individual 13 week earnings represented the more frequent reporting 
condition and the aggregated 13 week earnings represented the less frequent reporting condition.   
In order to create additional instruments, the data stream was extended and a different 
overlapping 12 quarters were selected and the process repeated.  In both conditions, the 
seasonality present was always in the same quarter.  That is, there was no weekly seasonality to 
confuse participants.  For example, if there was strong fourth quarter seasonality present in the 
quarterly (less frequent) data, then there was strong fourth quarter seasonality present in the 
weekly (more frequent) data.  Further, the data was constructed such that prediction periods 
alternated between instruments. That is, the predicted period was upwards in some cases and 
downwards in other cases, but the fourth quarter seasonality was present in all eight versions of 
the instrument. This prevents investors from accurately predicting earnings by simply guessing 
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or assuming the direction of earnings due to a preconceived idea or generalizations such as audit 
effects.5   
 Each weekly instrument was tested to ensure that it contained the same information 
content as the less frequent or aggregated data.  This was accomplished by taking the data from 
each weekly instrument and using regression to estimate the both the phi (φ) and the delta (δ) 
parameters.  Those parameters where then used to forecast the predicted quarter of interest.  The 
same was done with the quarterly data and the two predictions were then compared to ensure that 
no significant differences existed.  The underlying idea behind such testing was to ensure that 
that if participants in both groups processed the data as pure “statistical machines”, they would 
reach the same predictions regardless of the reporting frequency condition.  It is also worth 
noting that participants were given the data on a CD disk and each had a computer at their 
disposal.  This way participants could aggregate the data, run any analysis they wished before 
making their predictions.  Such measures biased against finding any results of adverse effects of 
more frequent reporting. 
Experimental Task and Procedure  
Investors received a packet along with an instruction sheet. Each packet contained a consent 
form, case materials, and a post-experiment questionnaire. The case materials informed investors 
that the most recent quarter end for the target firm was December 31, 2003. Investors were asked 
to predict earnings for the first quarter of 2004. In the more frequent reporting condition, a 
special caution was added to ensure that participants gave a quarterly and not a weekly 
prediction. Investors received earnings data in both tabular and graph form. In addition, a disk 
containing the tabular data in an excel spreadsheet was also given to the investors to aid in 
                                                 
5
 Audit effects describe a scenario where firms manage final quarter earnings upwards to make up for previous 
quarters shortfalls.  
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calculations or reformatting of graphs if they desired. Experimental sessions took place in a 
computer lab, and all investors had access to spreadsheets. After making their predictions, 
investors were asked to generate the equivalent of 90% confidence intervals. See Appendices for 
examples of instruments. 
At the conclusion of the prediction task, a post-experiment questionnaire was administered.  
Questions were included on investors’ (1) stock market experience, (2) finance and statistical 
knowledge, (3) risk attitude, (4) judgments about the perceived volatility of the data, and (5) 
reports of the level of importance and influence of recent time periods in their judgments. The 
latter allowed for the identification of recency effects. Questions targeted at assessing the 
investors’ comprehension of range and variance was also included in the post-experiment 
questionnaire. Finally, investors were required to describe in detail how they generated their 
prediction. Investors earned class credit for participation in the experiment. In addition, investors 
with predictions within $.04 of the actual earnings per share (20 in total) earned an additional 
$10.    
Participants  
Participants in the experiment were 84 first and second year MBA students and Masters of 
Accounting students from a large state university in the Midwest. Participants were recruited 
from an MBA financial statement analysis class. Results from 12 participants were excluded 
because they generated weekly earnings predictions instead of quarterly earnings predictions, 
resulting in 72 participants being used in the analysis. Twenty-two (31%) of the participants 
indicated they had investing experience, which ranged from one month to 84 months. The 
average number of university level finance courses taken was three and the average number of 
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statistics courses taken by participants was two. The data was collected in one day with some 
participants attending a morning session while others attended an evening session.  
 
4.  RESULTS 
Overview 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 test the between-subjects effects of more frequent reporting on absolute 
prediction error and dispersion of predictions.  H3 tests whether or not predictions were a result 
of either primacy or recency effects.6 
Test of hypothesis 1 
H1 states that nonprofessional investors’ earnings predictions will be less accurate, as 
measured by their absolute prediction errors, in the more frequent reporting condition than in the 
less frequent reporting condition. Table 1 panel A reports the cell means and standard deviations. 
As expected, the absolute prediction error was larger (mean = .14) with more frequent reporting 
than with less frequent reporting (mean = .09). This difference was significant, as shown by the 
main effect of frequency in the ANOVA reported in Table 1, Panel B (F = 4.04, p < .05). There 
were also main effects of direction (F = 15.83, p < .00) and random error draw (F = 25.16, p < 
.00). However, there were no interactions involving these factors and frequency (all F’s < 1.54, 
p’s > .22).   These results provide support for H1.   
----Insert Table 1 Here---- 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Although I did not hypothesize effects of direction of prediction or random error draw, ANOVAs revealed 
main effects of both these factors on prediction accuracy. However, neither direction of prediction nor random error 
draw interacted with the main variable of interest, frequency of reporting.   
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Test of Hypothesis 2 
     H2 predicts that the dispersion of predictions will be larger in the more frequent reporting 
condition than in the less frequent reporting condition. Table 1, Panel C reports the variances of 
investors’ earnings forecasts and results of the F-test for equal variances.  The variance for the 
more frequent reporting condition (0.016) was greater than the variance for the less frequent 
reporting condition (0.006, F
 
= 2.56, p <.00).  These results support H2. 
Test of Hypothesis 3 
 H3 predicts that participants will exhibit effects of primacy in the more frequent reporting 
condition and recency effects in the less frequent reporting condition.  Comparisons of the self-
reported weights across conditions were conducted to identify the presence of recency or 
primacy effects. Table 1, Panel D shows that investors in the more frequent reporting condition 
reported a weight of 8.4 in the most recent period (t-1) while those in the less frequent reporting 
condition reported a weight of 18.2 (p < .003, not reported). Additionally, investors in the more 
frequent reporting condition reported a weight of 18.6 for the earliest quarter reported (t-12)  
while those in the less frequent reporting condition reported a weight of 12.5 (p < .03, not 
reported).  These results suggest the presence of primacy and recency effects and are consistent 
with the BA model.7   
Supplemental Analyses 
Although the main effects of experience and the frequency * experience interaction are not 
significant, I compared the prediction errors of the more and less experienced  participants to 
allay concerns that the effect of frequency might be largely dependent on less experienced 
                                                 
7
 I am unable to verify that participants did in fact place greater weight on early or late observations as a 
function of reporting frequency.  Consequently the reader should interpret the results as only suggestive of primacy 
and recency effects.  
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participants.  Qualitatively, the analysis reveals that the difference between the frequency groups 
was greater for those participants who indicated they had investing experience.  Here, experience 
is treated as a categorical, 0 – 1 variable where 1 represents previous investing experience and 0 
otherwise (in the ANOVAs used to test hypotheses, experience is included as a continuous 
variable, number of months of investing experience).  For experienced participants the mean was 
.08 in the less frequent reporting condition and .14 in the more frequent condition.  For 
inexperienced participants the mean was .10 in the less frequent reporting condition and .14 in 
the more frequent condition (not reported). Thus the results cannot be explained by a lack of 
investing experience. 
Additionally, I also compared the confidence intervals generated by the participants to ensure 
predictions and dispersions were not adversely affected by greater perceived risk and/or 
difficulty.    That is, if participants in the more frequent reporting condition perceived the 
reported earnings to be extremely risky and/or difficult to analyze, they would generate wider 
confidence intervals than those in the less frequent reporting condition.  However, the mean 
confidence intervals were .57 for both the less and more frequent reporting conditions (not 
reported).  Thus the differences in prediction accuracy and dispersion cannot be attributed to 
differences in confidence. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates the effects of more frequent reporting on nonprofessional investors’ 
earnings predictions. As hypothesized, I find that more frequent reporting of earnings per share 
results in less accurate and more dispersed predictions of quarterly earnings per share. Analysis 
of self- reported data suggests that investors were influenced by recency or primacy effects.  
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This study is subject to several limitations. First, I limited the amount of information 
investors received. Typically, when investors are evaluating the financial performance of a firm, 
more information is available and the information environment is more complex.  However, 
reducing the complexity allows me to make stronger inferences about the effects of more 
frequent reporting.  Second, this experiment uses MBA students as surrogates for 
nonprofessional investors.  It is likely that they have less investment experience than many 
nonprofessional investors and therefore their actions may not accurately reflect the opinions of 
actual investors. Elliot, Hodge, Kennedy, and Pronk (2007) find that MBA students who have 
completed core courses and enrolled in or completed a course in financial statement analysis are 
a good proxy for nonprofessional investors in tasks low in integrative complexity.  Integrative 
complexity is defined as the ability to draw relatively simple (complex) connections between 
distinct characteristics of the information set and subsequent judgments and decisions.  Investors 
in this study had completed their core coursework, but had not completed nor where they 
enrolled in a financial statement analysis class.  While the task in this study would likely be 
considered low in integrative complexity8, it is possible that the decisions of investors in this 
study could differ from those of nonprofessional investors. Third, this research examines the 
effects of investors using either more or less frequently reported information. Technology will 
make it possible for investors to view both forms simultaneously. It is possible that the 
presentation of more frequently reported information along with less frequently reported 
information could minimize the cognitive load making it less likely that investors will rely on 
heuristics such as recency or primacy.  However, it is also possible that the investors may believe 
the more frequently reported data is more informative and superior to the less frequently reported 
                                                 
8
 The task in this experiment most closely resembles that of Maines and Hand (1996), which was classified as low 
integrative complexity by the Elliot et al. 2007. 
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information leading to adverse processing effects.  Finally, while weekly financial reporting is 
not currently implemented by firms, it is important to understand that the current research uses 
two extremes of financial reporting to illustrate possible implications from differences in 
financial reporting frequencies more so than to claim weekly data is worse than quarterly data 
per se. Consequently the design and results should be taken for their theoretical implications.  
Future research should examine if and how the joint presentation of more and less frequent 
reporting affects investor judgment. Finally, this experiment uses earnings data that contains 
fourth quarter seasonality which may not be applicable to all firms. Future research should 
investigate the effects of more frequent reporting when earnings data has different properties (i.g. 
random walk). 
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FIGURE 1: More Frequent Reporting-Seasonal Data (partial table)  
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FIGURE 2:  Less Frequent Reporting-Seasonal Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quarterly Earnings
$0.00
$0.50
$1.00
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Time Period - Quarter 
EPS 
  22  
Table 1 
Analysis of the Effects of More Frequent Reporting on Accuracy and Dispersion. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A:  Means, Standard Deviations in parentheses and variances in brackets9 
 
Dependent Variable  Prediction error  Variance    
      
Reporting Frequency   Less More    Less  More     
 
Mean    0.09 0.14   ----- -----    
Median   0.07 0.08   ----- -----    
(s.d.)[Var]   (0.08) (0.13)   [0.006] [0.016]   
N    31 41   31 41    
 
Panel B:  Test-H1-Between-Subjects ANOVA with Absolute Prediction Error as Dependent 
Variable10 
 
Source       df  F-value p-value 
Corrected Model     15      3.11  .00 
Intercept      1  100.89  .00 
Frequency      1      4.04  .05 
Direction      1    15.83  .00 
Rand.Error      1    25.16  .00 
Error       56 
Total       72 
Corrected Total     71 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Analysis of the Effects of More Frequent Reporting on Accuracy and Dispersion. 
 
Panel C:  Test-H2 -Between-Subjects Test with Variance as Dependent Variable.  
 
F test   p-value    
Less Frequent < More frequent reporting   F = 2.56        p < 0.00 
 
Panel D:  Descriptives:  Self Reported Weights Reported  
 
     Period t-1  Period t-12  
Less Frequency  18.2   12.5   
  
 More Frequency  8.4   18.6   
 
                                                 
9
 Frequency = Frequency conditions between subjects: more and less reporting in forecasting tasks; Direction = 
Direction of change-upward or downward-between earnings in the last reported period and the forecasted period; 
Rand-Error = Two different random error draws used to create earnings series.  
10
  A complete ANOVA was conducted, Random error*direction significant at the p<.05. There were no other 
variables or interactions significant at the p < .10.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Example of Less Frequent Reporting Instrument 
The current date is December 31, 2003. You own stock in ALPHA, Inc. and want to predict 
earnings per share for the next quarter (January – March 2004, a total of 13 weeks). The 
following pages contain a history of earnings per share for the past three years along with graphs 
to aid in your decision. You can review the pages in any order you desire and you can revisit 
pages if you desire. The disk contains a copy of the data tables presented below. The earnings 
data in the worksheet is protected and you cannot make changes to it. However, you can use the 
adjacent areas in the worksheet for any calculations you wish to make. 
 
 
 
Based on the information provided on the following pages,  
please provide your best prediction of earnings per share for Quarter 1, 2004 
[January 1, 2004 - March 31, 2004].   
 
 
1. Your prediction of earnings per share is:  $ _______________ 
 
 
 
2. The actual earnings per share may not turn out to be exactly the same as you 
predicted in your answer to the previous question.  But you probably have some idea 
of the range within which earnings per share is likely to fall. 
With this in mind, please answer the following questions: 
 
 
a. “I would be extremely surprised (no more than a 5% chance of occurring) if next 
quarter’s earnings were higher than $______________”  
 
 
b. “I would be extremely surprised (no more than a 5% chance of occurring)  if next 
quarter’s earnings were lower than $________________” 
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 2001 2002 2003 
Qtr. 1 $1.95 $2.04 $2.32 
Qtr. 2 $1.72 $1.81 $2.03 
Qtr. 3 $1.65 $1.69 $1.91 
Qtr.4 $1.66 $1.74 $2.00 
 
 
 
Quarterly Earnings 
$0.00
$0.50
$1.00
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Time Period - Quarter 
EPS 
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APPENDIX 2 
Example of More Frequent Reporting Instrument 
The current date is December 31, 2003. You own stock in ALPHA, Inc. and want to predict 
earnings per share for the next quarter (January – March 2004, a total of 13 weeks). The 
following pages contain a history of earnings per share for the past three years along with graphs 
to aid in your decision. You can review the pages in any order you desire and you can revisit 
pages if you desire.  In the past, we have discovered that some students like to make calculations. 
Because we value your time, we have included a disk that contains a copy of the data tables 
presented below. The earnings data in the worksheet is protected and you cannot make changes 
to it. Although it is not required, you can use the adjacent areas in the worksheet for any 
calculations you wish to make. 
 
Based on the information provided on the following pages,  
please provide your best prediction of earnings per share for Quarter 1, 2004 
[January 1, 2004 - March 31, 2004].   
 
 
3. Your prediction of earnings per share is:  $ _______________ 
(Please make sure you give a prediction for 13 weeks of earnings, not a single 
week) 
 
 
4. The actual earnings per share may not turn out to be exactly the same as you 
predicted in your answer to the previous question.  But you probably have some idea 
of the range within which earnings per share is likely to fall. 
With this in mind, please answer the following questions: 
 
 
a. “I would be extremely surprised (no more than a 5% chance of occurring) if next 
quarter’s earnings were higher than $______________”  
 
b. “I would be extremely surprised (no more than a 5% chance of occurring)  if next 
quarter’s earnings were lower than $________________” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  27  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
2001 
          
  Qtr. 1  Qtr. 2  Qtr. 3  Qtr.4    
            
 1/1 Week1 0.16 Week 14 0.13 Week 27 0.11 Week 40 0.13   
  Week 2 0.16 Week 15 0.14 Week 28 0.13 Week 41 0.12   
  Week 3 0.14 Week 16 0.14 Week 29 0.14 Week 42 0.13   
  Week 4 0.14 Week 17 0.13 Week 30 0.12 Week 43 0.14   
  Week 5 0.16 Week 18 0.12 Week 31 0.13 Week 44 0.14   
  Week 6 0.15 Week 19 0.13 Week 32 0.14 Week 45 0.13   
  Week 7 0.15 Week 20 0.14 Week 33 0.12 Week 46 0.11   
  Week 8 0.15 Week 21 0.13 Week 34 0.13 Week 47 0.12   
  Week 9 0.15 Week 22 0.11 Week 35 0.11 Week 48 0.13   
  Week 10 0.15 Week 23 0.12 Week 36 0.16 Week 49 0.13   
  Week 11 0.13 Week 24 0.14 Week 37 0.13 Week 50 0.14   
  Week 12 0.16 Week 25 0.14 Week 38 0.11 Week 51 0.13   
  Week 13 0.15 Week 26 0.15 Week 39 0.12 Week 52 0.11  12/31 
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Year 
2002 
          
  Qtr. 1  Qtr. 2  Qtr. 3  Qtr.4    
            
 1/1 Week 1 0.16 Week 14 0.15 Week 27 0.14 Week 40 0.15   
  Week 2 0.15 Week 15 0.14 Week 28 0.14 Week 41 0.13   
  Week 3 0.16 Week 16 0.15 Week 29 0.12 Week 42 0.11   
  Week 4 0.15 Week 17 0.15 Week 30 0.13 Week 43 0.15   
  Week 5 0.15 Week 18 0.13 Week 31 0.13 Week 44 0.13   
  Week 6 0.16 Week 19 0.14 Week 32 0.13 Week 45 0.13   
  Week 7 0.15 Week 20 0.13 Week 33 0.13 Week 46 0.11   
  Week 8 0.17 Week 21 0.14 Week 34 0.12 Week 47 0.13   
  Week 9 0.17 Week 22 0.14 Week 35 0.13 Week 48 0.14   
  Week 10 0.15 Week 23 0.14 Week 36 0.11 Week 49 0.14   
  Week 11 0.17 Week 24 0.14 Week 37 0.14 Week 50 0.14   
  Week 12 0.16 Week 25 0.13 Week 38 0.14 Week 51 0.15   
  Week 13 0.14 Week 26 0.13 Week 39 0.13 Week 52 0.13  12/31 
             
 
 
 
 Year 
2003 
          
  Qtr. 1  Qtr. 2  Qtr. 3  Qtr.4    
            
 1/1 Week 1 0.17 Week 14 0.13 Week 27 0.14 Week 40 0.15   
  Week 2 0.16 Week 15 0.14 Week 28 0.15 Week 41 0.16   
  Week 3 0.20 Week 16 0.17 Week 29 0.15 Week 42 0.15   
  Week 4 0.18 Week 17 0.17 Week 30 0.15 Week 43 0.15   
  Week 5 0.17 Week 18 0.15 Week 31 0.14 Week 44 0.16   
  Week 6 0.18 Week 19 0.14 Week 32 0.14 Week 45 0.14   
  Week 7 0.19 Week 20 0.15 Week 33 0.15 Week 46 0.14   
  Week 8 0.18 Week 21 0.17 Week 34 0.15 Week 47 0.14   
  Week 9 0.17 Week 22 0.16 Week 35 0.15 Week 48 0.17   
  Week 10 0.19 Week 23 0.16 Week 36 0.16 Week 49 0.16   
  Week 11 0.17 Week 24 0.15 Week 37 0.15 Week 50 0.16   
  Week 12 0.18 Week 25 0.16 Week 38 0.13 Week 51 0.16   
  Week 13 0.18 Week 25 0.18 Week 39 0.15 Week 52 0.16  12/311
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